

Message Text

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SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT LESLIE H. GELB FRONT PAGE BYLINER, MONDAY, DECEMBER 29, NEW YORK TIMES, HEADLINED "DETENTE'S SUPPORTERS UNDER FIRE IN THE U.S.; FACED WITH A FORMIDABLE ARRAY OF FOES, KISSINGER MUTES HIS PRAISE OF POLICY -- MOSCOW'S MOTIVES QUESTIONED."
2. WASHINGTON -- AS THE ELECTION YEAR BEGINS, THE POLICY OF DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS SHAKY AND ITS BACKERS ARE ON THE DEFENSIVE.
3. ARRAYED AGAINST THE POLICY IS A FORMIDABLE LIST OF POLITICIANS, INTELLECTUALS, LABOR LEADERS AND TOP MILITARY MEN. SOME PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN BOTH PARTIES -- RONALD REAGAN, GEORGE C. WALLACE AND HENRY M. JACKSON -- ARE SEEKING TO MAKE DETENTE A CAMPAIGN ISSUE.

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4. THEIR ATTACKS ARE GIVEN FORCE BY SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN

ANGOLA, PORTUGAL AND THE MIDDLE EAST, BY ALLEGATIONS OF SOVIET CHEATING ON NUCLEAR-ARMS PACTS AND BY INCIDENTS LIKE PRESIDENT FORD'S REFUSAL TO MEET WITH ALEKSANDR I. SOLZHENITSYN.

5. THE ATTACKS HAVE FORCED SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER TO ABANDON THE UPBEAT RHETORIC ON DETENTE THAT CHARACTERIZED THE NIXON YEARS. INSTEAD OF "A GENERATION OF PEACE," HE SPEAKS OF "NO ALTERNATIVE TO DETENTE" IN THE NUCLEAR AGE AND WARNS MOSCOW IN LANGUAGE THAT SOUNDS MUCH LIKE THAT OF HIS CRITICS.

6. EVEN SO, INTERVIEWS WITH DOZENS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND OFFICIALS, PLUS THE RESULTS OF PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS, INDICATE THAT THERE IS BROAD SUPPORT FOR DETENTE AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THE INTERVIEWS AND POLLS SHOW, HOWEVER, THAT THE SUPPORT IS SHALLOW, ACCOMPANIED BY DEEP SUSPICION OF MOSCOW'S MOTIVES AND WIDESPREAD SENTIMENT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE HAD THE BETTER OF THE DEAL.

7. ABOVE ALL, IT APPEARS THAT AMERICANS ARE CONFUSED ABOUT DETENTE. THE WORD DETENTE -- IT MEANS RELAXATION OF TENSIONS -- HAS BECOME EQUATED WITH PEACE, BUT THE PUBLIC FINDS THAT DIFFICULTIES WITH MOSCOW SEEM TO PERSIST. VIRTUALLY ALL LEADERS HAVE CONTINUED TO PAY LIP SERVICE TO DETENTE, YET MANY HAVE GONE ON TO CONDEMN ITS RESULTS AND EFFECTS.

8. WHAT ARE THE ROOTS OF DETENTE? WHY DID THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WANT IT? HOW HAVE THEY PRACTICED IT? WHAT HAVE THE BENEFITS AND DISADVANTAGES BEEN? WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

9. FROM PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER'S "SPIRIT OF CAMP DAVID" THROUGH PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY'S CALL FOR A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS, WHICH LED TO THE LIMITED TREATY ON A NUCLEAR TEST BAN, TO PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON'S PROPOSAL FOR "RECONCILIATION WITH THE EAST," WHICH PRODUCED THE TREATY AGAINST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THE FIRST TALKS ON A LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS, EPISODIC
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EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MADE TOWARD DETENTE.

10. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP WERE ELABORATED AMID MUCH FANFARE BY PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON AND THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CHIEF, LEONID I. BREZHNEV, IN MAY 1972.

11. EVEN AT THE HEIGHT OF THE COLD WAR SUCH EFFORTS PROVED

HIGHLY POPULAR. DURING THE SAME PERIOD SOVIET LEADERS WERE CALLING FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE.

12. BOTH SIDES PLEDGED TO PREVENT "THE DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATIONS CAPABLE OF CAUSING A DANGEROUS EXACERBATION OF THEIR RELATIONS," TO ESCHEW "UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE" AND

"TO DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER SO THAT CONFLICTS OR SITUATIONS WILL NOT ARISE WHICH WOULD SERVE TO INCREASE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS."

13. A RANKING STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL EXPLAINED: "THE BASIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IS THAT COEXISTENCE WAS PASSIVE AND DETENTE IS A POLICY OF ACTIVELY TRYING TO INVOLVE THE RUSSIANS IN A CONTINUING SERIES OF AGREEMENTS."

14. THE CHANGE WAS MARKED BY TWO ELEMENTS: BOTH SIDES TONED DOWN THE IDEOLOGICAL RHETORIC OF CONFRONTATION. EACH BEGAN TO PORTRAY THE OTHER IN LESS SIMPLISTIC WAYS, NOT JUST AS MONOLITHS. SOVIET OFFICIALS SPOKE OF "REALISTIC" LEADERS IN WASHINGTON BATTLING WITH OLD COLD WARRIORS, AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS TALKED OF DOVES STRUGGLING WITH HAWKS IN MOSCOW.

15. EACH FOUND A RATIONALE FOR DEALING WITH THE OTHER, FOR THOUGH IT IS RARELY EXCUSABLE TO BARGAIN WITH THE DEVIL, IT IS ALWAYS PERMISSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE WITH AN ADVERSARY.

16. THE UPSHOT WAS A SEEMINGLY ENDLESS FOUNTAIN OF AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR ARMS, CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES, AND TRADE, AMONG OTHERS.

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17. IN THE UNITED STATES THERE FOLLOWED AN EVER-RISING LEVEL OF EXPECTATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

18. MR. NIXON AND MR. KISSINGER, BY ALL ACCOUNTS, HAVE SAID THAT DETENTE IS GOOD POLITICS AND GOOD POLICY.

19. EVEN MR. KISSINGER ACKNOWLEDGES PRIVATELY THAT MR. NIXON OVERSOLD DETENTE AS "A STRUCTURE OF PEACE," BUT THE SECRETARY HAS DIFFICULTY RECALLING HIS OWN ROLE IN THE SELLING PROCESS. "NIXON WAS RUNNING FOR RE-ELECTION -- I WASN'T," HE HAS BEEN HEARD TO REMARK.

20. SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, DEMOCRAT OF MINNESOTA,

FEELS THAT THE COUNTRY IS STILL READY FOR DETENTE: "THE PEOPLE ARE MORE SOPHISTICATED ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY AND MORE RELAXED ABOUT THE RUSSIANS. I'M FOR DETENTE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS, AND SO ARE THE PEOPLE. THEY HAVE SENSE. THEY KNOW THAT INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS RISE IN THE PENTAGON AND AMONG ITS FRIENDS EVERY YEAR AT BUDGET TIME."

21. THE HOUSE MINORITY LEADER, REPRESENTATIVE JOHN J. RHODES, REPUBLICAN OF ARIZONA, ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE TIME WAS RIPE -- AND STILL IS, TO A LESSER EXTENT -- BUT FOR DIFFERENT REASONS. "AMERICANS SINCERELY DESIRE PEACE, DON'T TRUST THE RUSSIANS AND WANT TO BE LEFT ALONE," HE EXPLAINED. "THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE POOR WANT TO GET AWAY FROM HEAVY TAX BURDENS, AND THE ONLY WAY TO DO THIS IS BY CUTTING MILITARY SPENDING." MUCH OF THE SUPPORT FOR DETENTE HAS BEEN BASED ON "WISHFUL THINKING," IN HIS VIEW.

22. MR. NIXON AND MR. KISSINGER, ACCORDING TO THEIR AIDES, SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE IT HAD BECOME A WORLD POWER THAT HAD TO BE RECKONED WITH. AS A KISSINGER AIDE EXPLAINED, "FOR 25 YEARS WE WERE CONTAINING A NATION THAT REALLY DIDN'T HAVE THE POWER TO THREATEN US AROUND THE WORLD, AND THEN AROUND 1970, WHEN RUSSIA BECAME A REAL WORLD THREAT, THE IRONY WAS THAT VIETNAM HAD SAPPED OUR WILL TO CONTINUE CONTAINING THEM."

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23. THE ONLY CLEAR PUBLIC EXPLICATION OF THIS VIEW WAS MADE SOME MONTHS AGO BY HELMUT SONNENFELDT, COUNSELOR OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT: "THE SOVIET UNION IS ONLY JUST BEGINNING ITS TRULY 'IMPERIAL' PHASE; ITS MILITARY FORCES HAVE ACQUIRED INTERCONTINENTAL REACH ONLY FAIRLY RECENTLY; ITS CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN REMOTE AREAS IS OF RELATIVELY RECENT STANDING; AND IT IS ONLY JUST ACQUIRING THE HABIT OF DEFINING ITS INTERESTS ON A GLOBAL RATHER THAN A SOLELY CONTINENTAL BASIS."

24. IN THE VIEW OF MR. KISSINGER AND HIS EXPERTS, WHAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED FROM DETENTE WAS RECOGNITION OF THEIR STATUS AS AN EQUAL -- TO BE SEEN AT THE TOP OF THE MOUNTAIN WITH THE UNITED STATES.

25. AT THE SAME TIME THE SOVIET LEADERS DID NOT TRY TO CONCEAL THEIR DESIRE FOR HELP WITH THEIR ECONOMY BY OBTAINING THE BENEFITS OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND EXPORT CREDITS.

26. AS DISCERNED BY FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MELVIN R. LAIRD, AMONG MANY, THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT SIMPLY DESIROUS

OF ECONOMIC HELP AND SEEKING TO PLAY BIG-POWER DIPLOMACY; TO HIM THEY WERE USING DETENTE MAINLY "TO UNDERMINE WESTERN DEMOCRACY AND IMPOSE THEIR SYSTEM UPON THE WORLD." IN THIS VIEW, DETENTE WAS A TACTIC TO GET THE UNITED STATES TO LOWER ITS GUARD.

27. WHATEVER THE SOVIET AMBITIONS, THE STRATEGY EVOLVED BY MR. NIXON AND MR. KISSINGER WAS TO TRANSFORM THEM INTO A FOUNDATION FOR RESTRAINT. AS EXPLAINED BY STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS, THE IDEA WAS TO USE A WIDE VARIETY OF FORM AGREEMENTS TO CREATE A WEB OF INCENTIVES AND PENALTIES.

28. THIS CENTRAL RELATIONSHIP WAS SUPPOSED TO ACT AS A RESTRAINT ON SOVIET ADVENTURES IN PERIPHERAL AREAS. WHEN MOSCOW INVOLVED ITSELF IN THE OCTOBER 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AND IN PORTUGAL, MR. KISSINGER WARNED OF THE EFFECTS ON DETENTE. LAST WEEK HE SAID THAT "THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT OUR OVER-ALL RELATIONSHIP WILL SUFFER IF WE DO NOT FIND AN ADEQUATE SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM." THE UNCLASSIFIED

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IMPLICATION WAS: NO SOVIET MOVE TO SETTLE ANGOLA, THEN LESS CHANCE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL RECEIVE THE GRAIN THEY SO BADLY NEED AND PERHAPS LESS CHANCE OF A NEW NUCLEAR-ARMS PACT.

29. MR. NIXON AND MR. KISSINGER ALSO BELIEVED THAT CONTINUED AMERICAN MILITARY POWER WAS NEEDED "TO CONSTRAIN SOVIET AMBITIONS. THEIR PROBLEM WAS TO COUNTERACT WANING AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR MILITARY SPENDING. THEIR TECHNIQUE WAS TO TRANSFORM POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DETENTE INTO SUPPORT FOR THE WHEREWITHAL TO BARGAIN ON EQUAL TERMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

30. THE CODE TERM FOR THIS WAS BARGAINING CHIPS. TO GET THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO BUILD A MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM, THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN BUILDING ONE ITSELF; TO BRING ABOUT MUTUAL TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE, AMERICAN TROOPS WOULD HAVE TO STAY THERE.

31. SOVIET LEADERS PROVED EQUALLY ANXIOUS TO REACH THE AGREEMENTS THAT UNDERPINNED DETENTE, BUT THEY NEVER USED THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION'S GLOWING PHRASES. INSTEAD OF A STRUCTURE THEY TALKED OF A PROCESS -- AS MR. KISSINGER LATER DID. INSTEAD OF A SINGLE OVER-ALL RELATIONSHIP THEY SPOKE OF MUTUAL INTERESTS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS AND DIVERGENT INTERESTS IN PERIPHERAL AREAS.

32. THE SOVIET POSITION WAS REFLECTED IN AN IZVESTIA EDITORIAL LAST MONTH THAT SAID: "SOME WOULD LIKE TO CON-

VINCE US THAT THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IN THE WORLD AND SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE ARE INCOMPATIBLE THINGS. SIMILAR THINGS HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED BEFORE, BUT IN VAIN. THE PROCESS OF DETENTE DOES NOT MEAN AND NEVER MEANT THE FREEZING OF THE SOCIAL-POLITICAL STATUS QUO."

33. NOR DID THE SOVIET VERSION OF DETENTE PRECLUDE SUPPORTING "REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES," AS IN PORTUGAL, OR ELIMINATING "HOTBEDS OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL TENSION," AS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

34. A NUMBER OF THE AMERICAN-SOVIET AGREEMENTS WERE NON-UNCLASSIFIED

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CONTROVERSIAL. OTHERS, LIKE A REGULARIZATION OF THE BERLIN SITUATION AND THE TREATY LIMITING MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, WERE WIDELY APPLAUDED AS IMPORTANT AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS.

35. STILL OTHERS GENERATED POLITICAL STORMS. THERE IS LITTLE DISAGREEMENT NOW THAT THE RUSSIANS GOT THE BETTER OF THE 1972 GRAIN SALES, BUYING WELL BELOW THE MARKET PRICE WHILE THE AMERICAN CONSUMER PAID THE DIFFERENCE. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE AMERICAN GRAIN FARMER SAW THE SOVIET UNION AS A VITAL NEW MARKET.

36. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE TALKS ON STRATEGIC-ARMS LIMITATIONS WAS EVEN MORE INTENSE. CRITICS ON THE RIGHT CONTENDED THAT THE AGREEMENT LIMITING OFFENSIVE MISSILE LAUNCHERS, WHICH ENDS IN 1977, GAVE THE SOVIET UNION IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES. CRITICS ON THE LEFT ASSERTED THAT THE RESULT WAS NOT ARMS CONTROL AT ALL BUT MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING AND PLANNED WEAPONS.

37. THE ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE WAS THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT LEFT THE UNITED STATES WITH IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES IN NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND BOMBERS AND THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS THE BEST THAT COULD BE NEGOTIATED.

38. A CONTROVERSY OF EQUAL DIMENSIONS ERUPTED OVER GRANTING THE SOVIET UNION NONDISCRIMINATORY TRADING STATUS AND LARGE EXPORT CREDITS. CRITICS ALL ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, WHO INSISTED THAT THERE MUST BE A CLEAR QUID PRO QUO, FASTENED ON THE IDEA OF LINKING THE TRADE ARRANGEMENTS TO A SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE EMIGRATION OF JEWS. RATHER THAN SUBMIT, MOSCOW CANCELLED THE TRADE AGREEMENT.

39. EVEN SUCH CRITICS OF MR. KISSINGER AS PROF. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT HE WAS PROBABLY RIGHT. JEWISH EMIGRATION EXCEEDED 30,000 AS A

RESULT OF MR. KISSINGER'S QUIET DIPLOMACY AND DROPPED SHARPLY AFTER THE CONTROVERSY. NEVERTHELESS, PROFESSOR BRZEZINSKI, AN EXPERT ON SOVIET AFFAIRS, MAINTAINED THAT MR. KISSINGER'S POLICY WAS MORALLY NEUTRAL AND THAT IT WAS WRONG TO SEPARATE DETENTE FROM HUMAN-RIGHTS ISSUES. HE IS UNCLASSIFIED

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JOINED IN THIS VIEW BY SENATOR JACKSON AND MANY INTELLECTUALS.

40. MR. JACKSON'S CRITICISM GOES DEEPER STILL -- TO THE NOTION THAT DETENTE HAS BEEN A POLICY OF MAKING UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS TO THE SOVIET UNION. OTHERS HAVE JOINED HIM, AMONG THEM FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER GEORGE MEANY, PRESIDENT OF THE A.F.L.-C.I.O., MR. REAGAN,

MR. WALLACE, THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS, THE AMERICAN LEGION AND THE FORMER NAVY COMMANDER, ADM. ELMO R. ZUMWALT JR.

41. THEY MAINTAIN THAT BY BOLSTERING THE SOVIET ECONOMY THROUGH CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY, DETENTE STRENGTHENS SOVIET MILITARY MIGHT. THEY ASSERT THAT MR. KISSINGER, BY URGING MR. FORD NOT TO SEE MR. SOLZHENITSYN, THE EXILED SOVIET WRITER AND NOBEL LAUREATE, FOR FEAR OF OFFENDING SOVIET LEADERS, GIVES TACIT APPROVAL TO THEIR REPRESSIVE INTERNAL POLICIES. THE CRITICS NOTE THAT MR. KISSINGER HAS NOT BEEN USING THE SOVIET UNION'S NEEDS FOR GRAIN AND CREDITS TO PRY CONCESSIONS AND RESTRAINT FROM IT.

42. THE DISPUTE BOILS DOWN TO THIS: CRITICS OF MR. KISSINGER MAINTAIN THAT HE HAS BEEN TRADING TANGIBLE BENEFITS FOR MERE WINDOW DRESSING AND THAT HE COULD HAVE WON REAL CONCESSIONS. HE RETORTS THAT SOVIET BEHAVIOR WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE AGGRESSIVE AND THAT TO HAVE PRESSED FOR MORE CONCESSIONS WOULD HAVE MEANT NO AGREEMENTS AT ALL.

43. IT APPEARS THAT CRITICS AND SUPPORTERS OF DETENTE ALIKE MAKE ESSENTIALLY UNPROVABLE CLAIMS. IT CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED THAT MORE PRESSURE WOULD HAVE PRODUCED MORE CONCESSIONS; IT CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED THAT SOVIET ACTIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN BOLDER THAN THEY WERE.

44. ALMOST EQUALLY HARD TO SORT OUT IS WHETHER DETENTE HAS REDUCED CONFRONTATION AND TENSIONS. PROFESSOR BRZEZINSKI CONTENTS: "THE ALTERNATIVE TO DETENTE IS NOT WAR BUT A VARIETY OF INTERMEDIATE PROPOSITIONS. WHEN UNCLASSIFIED

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THERE WAS NO DETENTE THERE WAS NO WAR EITHER."

45. HE NOTES THAT THERE HAS BEEN MUCH MORE DIRECT SOVIET TESTING OF AMERICAN WILL SINCE 1970 THAN THERE WAS IN THE EIGHT YEARS AFTER THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS IN 1962. HE CITES THE NASCENT SOVIET SUBMARINE BASE IN CIENFUEGOS, CUBA, TROUBLES OVER BERLIN AND THE JORDANIAN-SYRIAN BATTLE IN 1970, INDIA-BANGLADESH IN 1971, THE CHRISTMAS BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM IN 1972, THE MIDDLE EAST WAR IN 1973 AND CURRENT TENSIONS OVER PORTUGAL AND ANGOLA.

46. "ALL THAT MAY BE TRUE," MR. HUMPHREY SAID, "AND THERE ARE PROBLEMS IN THE WAY THE SECRETARY HAS CONDUCTED DETENTE BUT THE FACT IS THAT SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS ARE MUCH LESS TENSE THAN IN THE '50S AND '60S."

47. DETENTE SEEMS TO BE A MIXED BLESSING TO MANY IN THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL. EXPERTS ON SOVIET AFFAIRS POINT TO FREQUENT EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN BY THE RUSSIANS OVER DETENTE AS A WAY TO INTRODUCE WESTERN INFLUENCES INTO SOVIET SOCIETY. IN THE VIEW OF THE EXPERTS, CREDITS, TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNICIANS COULD TEND TO WEAKEN COMMUNIST PARTY CONTROL.

48. THERE APPEAR TO BE STRONG ELEMENTS THAT ARE WORRIED THAT DETENTE WILL ERODE THEIR POWER JUST AS POWERFUL ELEMENTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY VIEW IT AS A SOVIET TACTIC TO LULL THE UNITED STATES INTO DEFENSELESSNESS.

49. AS A RESULT OF THE PRESSURES, THE LEADERS IN BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE HARDENED THEIR RHETORIC AND THEIR BARGAINING POSITIONS. IN THE OPINION OF MOST OF THOSE INTERVIEWED ATTITUDES TOWARD DETENTE CAN GO EITHER WAY.

50. THE BASIC SUPPORT IS THERE IN THE UNITED STATES.

51. THE POLLSTER LOUIS HARRIS REPORTS: "THE PUBLIC WANTS THE KIND OF LEADERSHIP WHICH IS COMMITTED TO EASING TENSIONS BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE COMMUNIST SUPERPOWERS. THAT IS WHY SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER RECEIVES CONTINUING

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HIGH MARKS FOR HIS EFFORTS FROM THE PEOPLE."

52. IN THE OPINION OF ANOTHER POLLSTER, DANIEL YANKELOVICH,

"PEOPLE FAVOR COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE INTERESTS OF SECURING WORLD PEACE, BUT THE PUBLIC BELIEVES THAT IF WE DROP OUR GUARD EVEN A LITTLE BIT, THE SOVIET UNION IS ALL READY TO 'PUT ONE OVER ON US'."

53. WHILE ALL THOSE INTERVIEWED IN CONNECTION WITH THIS ARTICLE AGREED THAT SUPPORT FOR DETENTE HAD NOT BECOME AS IRREVERSIBLE AS MR. KISSINGER AND MR. BREZHNEV HAD HOPED TO MAKE IT, MOST OF THEM BELIEVED THAT DETENTE WOULD NOT BE EASY TO UNDERMINE. MR. RHODES AND MR. HUMPHREY BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD TAKE NOTHING SHORT OF FLAT PROOF OF SOVIET CHEATING OR ANOTHER CONFRONTATION LIKE THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

54. IN MR. RHODES'S JUDGMENT, THE BACKING FOR DETENTE IS SOLID ENOUGH TO WITHSTAND FAILURE TO REACH A NEW ACCORD LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS. "FAILURE WOULD WEAKEN THE WHOLE FABRIC OF SUPPORT," HE SAID, "BUT IT WOULD NOT LEAD TO A RETURN TO COLD WAR CONFRONTATION."

55. MANY OF THOSE INTERVIEWED WOULD PUT ANGOLA IN THE SAME CATEGORY.

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56. THE POLITICS OF DETENTE IS COMPELLING THE FORD ADMINISTRATION TO DRIVE HARDER BARGAINS WITH MOSCOW AND CONGRESS TO APPLY MORE EXACTING STANDARDS TO WHATEVER ACCORDS WILL BE REACHED.

57. "BUT IF HENRY COMES BACK FROM MOSCOW WITH A SOLID SALT AGREEMENT AND IS PREPARED TO STAND BY IT," MR. HUMPHREY SAID, REFERRING TO THE TALKS ON STRATEGIC ARMS, "I'LL SUPPORT HIM. THERE WILL BE PROBLEMS FOR SUCH A TREATY, BUT IT WILL PASS." MOST SHARED THIS JUDGMENT.

58. "THE BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR OVER THE NEXT YEARS IS THAT THINGS DON'T GET WORSE," ACCORDING TO MR. HUMPHREY. "RIGHT NOW REAGAN IS RUNNING THE WHITE HOUSE IN ABSENTIA, AND THE FEELING IN CONGRESS IS THAT KISSINGER LIKES AGREE-
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MENTS EVEN IF THEY AREN'T VERY GOOD."

59. A WELL-PLACED REPUBLICAN AIDE IN CONGRESS EXPLAINED, "THE CONSERVATIVES NEVER LIKED THE WAY KISSINGER WAS CONDUCTING DETENTE, BUT AS LONG AS NIXON WAS AROUND THEY FIGURED HENRY WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO GIVE AWAY THE STORE TO THE COMMUNISTS. BUT FORD -- THEY NEVER FELT HE COULD CONTROL HENRY."

60. MR. HUMPHREY AND MR. RHODES VOICED THE ESSENCE OF

WHAT THEIR COLLEAGUES HAD TO SAY: MR. RHODES -- "IF
THE SOVIETS KEEP PLAYING GAMES, SUPPORT FOR DETENTE WILL
ERODE"; MR. HUMPHREY -- "THE BURDEN ON DETENTE NOW IS
MOSTLY UP TO THE RUSSIANS." (END TEXT) ROBINSON

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